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The cocaine market presents a clear threat at global level. 
Well-defined locations of production in South America and 
large consumer markets in the Americas and Europe lead to 
trafficking routes from a circumscribed origin to specific, 
even if far-flung, destinations. While some parts of the world 
play a crucial role as transit regions, the routes, modali-
ties and networks employed by criminal actors continue to 
evolve, diversify and become more efficient. The increasingly 
globalized, interconnected, digitalized and technologically 
sophisticated nature of society, as well as a growing affluent 
demographic in some regions where cocaine use has tradi-
tionally been low, can potentially catalyse and accelerate the 
dynamism and expansion of the market.
The series Cocaine Insights, developed by UNODC in the 
framework of the CRIMJUST programme and in coopera-
tion with partners and stakeholders at national, regional 
and international levels, delivers the latest knowledge and 
trends on issues related to cocaine markets in an accessible 
and informative format.
Suggested citation: UNODC and EUROPOL, The illicit trade 
of cocaine from Latin America to Europe – from oligopolies to free-
for-all?, Cocaine Insights 1, UNODC, Vienna, September 2021.
Acknowledgements
This issue of the Cocaine Insights is the result of a special 
collaboration between UNODC and EUROPOL. 
Main contributors: Alan Arroyo, Chloé Carpentier, Sascha 
Strupp, Antoine Vella.
This issue benefited from the expertise of and invaluable 
advice from UNODC and EUROPOL colleagues.
UNODC and EUROPOL reiterate their appreciation and 
gratitude to Member States and partner agencies for the data 
and information that provide the basis of this publication.
UNODC and EUROPOL gratefully acknowledge the 
World Customs Organization Regional Intelligence Liaison 
Office for Western Europe for sharing some of their data.
This issue was produced thanks to the financial contribu-
tion of the European Union.
Disclaimer
This publication has not been formally edited. The content 
of this publication does not necessarily reflect the views or 
policies of UNODC or any contributory organization, nor 
does it imply any endorsement.
Comments on the report are welcome and can be sent to:
Drug Research Section 
Research and Trends Analysis Branch
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
PO Box 500
1400 Vienna, Austria
Cocaine Insights Table of Contents
Key findings
Future prospects for the European cocaine 
market
Changes in Colombia’s landscape and implica-
tions for Europe
UNODC perspective and policy implications
Recent developments in cocaine trafficking to 
Europe
The global cocaine trade and the role of criminal 
networks
European actors in Latin America and challenges 
to established supply chains
Latin American criminal networks maintaining a 
presence in Europe 
Knowledge gaps
THE ILLICIT TRADE OF COCAINE FROM LATIN AMERICA 










DTO Drug Trafficking Organization
EMCDDA European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction
EU European Union













Significant increase in cocaine supply to Europe
The supply chain to Europe has increased its efficiency and 
ultimately the accessibility of cocaine to European consumers.
Diversification of the trafficking groups 
The increased fragmentation of the criminal landscape in Colom-
bia has fostered the formation of new alliances among criminal 
groups and new opportunities for European criminal networks 
to establish new contacts with providers in South America. Some 
of these groups, notably Albanian-speaking and Western Balkan 
criminal networks, have become especially prominent in procur-
ing large quantities of cocaine directly at source – cutting out the 
middleman.
Erosion of the oligopoly
This diversification has undermined the competitive advan-
tage of the handful of well-established, well-connected 
criminal networks, such as the Italian ’Ndrangheta, which 
used to dominate large-scale trafficking across the Atlantic 
and nevertheless continue their large-scale trafficking activity, 
in parallel with new networks, contributing to an increased 
availability of cocaine in the European consumer market.
Shifting points of entry into Europe
The epicentre of the cocaine market in Europe has shifted 
northwards. The increased use of containerized shipments 







































Europe (23 countries, cocaine hydrochloride), common range (10th-90th weighted percentiles)
Europe (23 countries, cocaine hydrochloride), average weighted by estimated number of users






Convergence of the United States and European markets 
and expansion of the cocaine market can be seen in the 
level of cocaine purity that has reached the same level in 
Europe and in the United States and is on the increase.
Cocaine purity at retail level, Europe and the United States, 
2005-2018
Distribution of cocaine seizure quantities in Europe, by 
country of seizure (two-year moving averages), 2000-2019










































































The increased importance of Belgium relative to Spain 
and Portugal is reflected in seizure data
Seizures at seaports illustrate the large quantities entering 
through the North Sea coast
Cocaine seized at seaports by customs authorities of 
countries in Western and Central Europe, quantities 
seized in 2020 (or latest available data) and trend in com-
parison with 2019
Source: World Customs Organization, Regional Intelligence Liaison 













Quantity of cocaine seized
Area of circle is proportional 
to quantity seized
Trend in 2020
and Hamburg has consolidated the role of the Netherlands 
as a staging point and led to continental Europe’s North 
Sea coast overtaking the Iberian peninsula as the primary 







The current dynamics of diversification and proliferation of 
cocaine supply channels, criminal actors and modalities are 
likely to continue, if left unchecked. In addition to relatively 
high wholesale prices for cocaine achieved in European 
destination countries, repeated interdiction along the route 
from South to North America may also have contributed 
to rendering trafficking channels to Europe the path of 
least resistance of the expanding cocaine market. Illicit 
cultivation of coca bush threatens to expand beyond the 
traditional source countries of Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of ), Colombia and Peru, and clandestine establishments 
where cocaine is processed are increasingly proliferating 
in transit and consumer countries. Moreover, some parts 
of Africa are increasingly exposed as transit areas – which 
may itself catalyse the spread of cocaine use. 
Future prospects for the  
European cocaine market
UNODC perspective  
and policy implications
On the one hand, the diversification seen in the cocaine 
supply channels, criminal networks and modalities involved 
in the illicit cocaine trade reinforces the argument for inter-
vention at source, as this is the only stage in the supply 
chain which remains circumscribed and therefore most 
amenable to targeted intervention.
Given that the current surge in the cocaine market appears 
to be primarily supply-driven, the international commu-
nity and the affected national governments must intensify 
their efforts to address the driving factors behind coca bush 
cultivation and the related illicit economy in the source 
countries, by means of alternative development programmes 
and the promotion of sustainable livelihoods, by strength-
ening the social fabric and targeting disenfranchisement of 
communities, and by consolidating governance structures, 
the presence of the state and the rule of law. 
On the other hand, this diversification, which has already 
resulted in increased flows and increased availability of 
cocaine at destination, is a sign of an ongoing process of 
proliferation and of globalization of the market, and calls 
for intensified measures to bring cocaine flows to Europe 
under control and pre-emptive measures to stem the further 
spread of demand.
In terms of supply reduction, the increasingly trans-
continental reach of criminal networks calls for close and 
pro-active collaboration of the criminal justice systems of 
source, transit and destination countries, including through 
Increased accessibility in Europe
As often happens in legal markets, the dynamics of com-
petition, diversification, specialization and opportunistic 
collaboration have contributed throughout the supply chain 
to Europe to increase its efficiency and ultimately the acces-
sibility of cocaine for European consumers. 
Increase in violence associated with the cocaine 
trade in Europe 
The booming cocaine market has entailed an increase in 
the occurrence of assassinations, shootings, bombings, 
arsons, kidnappings, torture and intimidation related to 
the trade in cocaine. The nature of the violence appears 
to have changed. A growing number of criminal networks 











mechanisms and fora specifically targeting the cocaine traf-
ficking routes in their coverage and membership. European 
stakeholders must strengthen their ability to anticipate 
and intercept shipments at the external border, to detect 
and identify the criminal operators and to investigate and 
prosecute them in a coordinated, strategic and incisive 
manner. In order to ensure a real impact, these activities 
must be calibrated to target the backbone and the higher 
echelons of criminal structures, disrupt the underlying net-
works and hence counter trafficking activities as effectively 
as possible. Criminal intelligence must be used to identify 
the higher levels of DTOs and inform actions to disrupt 
their business models.
Towards this objective, one key avenue is to promote trans-
atlantic information and intelligence-sharing mechanisms 
between criminal justice systems (including law enforce-
ment) which operate in a pro-active and timely manner, 
pool information from agencies from multiple countries 
and enable coordinated intelligence-led operations, con-
ducted with agility as the picture unfolds. Given the central 
role of containerized trade, it is important to strengthen 
the international protocol for shipments at the loading and 
trans-shipment stages, as well as the operating capacity at 
ports, so that authorities are more effective at intercepting 
shipments prior to arrival. Risk-profiling of suspect ship-
ments and recipient companies can be strengthened, for 
example by developing and sharing common criteria among 
port authorities, customs and law enforcement agencies.
Authorities must also target corruption at ports, without 
which many illicit shipments could not happen, and ensure 
that whistleblower mechanisms and anonymous reporting 
channels are in place and functioning adequately.
International cooperation must extend to collaboration 
across jurisdictions among investigators and among pros-
ecutors. Mechanisms and protocols are needed to facilitate 
such collaboration, including aspects such as building trust, 
enhancing understanding of institutional setups and iden-
tifying appropriate counterparts, bridging linguistic divides 
and enabling joint investigations. Such mechanisms are 
essential in order to render concrete and practical provisions 
of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime such as international cooperation for purposes of 
confiscation, extradition, transfer of sentenced persons, 
mutual legal assistance, joint investigations, controlled 
deliveries and other special investigative techniques, transfer 
of criminal proceedings and the establishment of a criminal 
record across jurisdictions.
Law enforcement must keep up with the increasingly 
sophisticated technology and communication platforms 
used by traffickers; legislators need to balance privacy 
concerns against operational needs of law enforcement, 
and regulators need to ensure that encryption technolo-
gies do not hamper access to information for investigators 
and prosecutors where this is allowed by law. Moreover 
governments must ensure that criminal justice systems 
possess the necessary expertise and resources to operate in 
an increasingly digitalized environment.
At a domestic level, it is important to ensure smooth inter-
agency cooperation in the efforts to counter the activities 
of drug trafficking organizations. Given the spectrum of 
areas which are involved in monitoring and countering 
organized drug trafficking, countries also need to consider 
the establishment of specialized roles and bodies to coor-
dinate, harness and focus law enforcement, investigative 
and prosecutorial efforts targeting organized crime groups 
and drug trafficking organizations. 
Governments must also make sure that drug trafficking 
does not pay, by targeting the financial arrangements which 
enable criminal organizations to reap the profits of their 
activities, in order to take away from the monetary gain 
which motivates trafficking activity and to prevent the 
infiltration of these arrangements into the legal economy. 
Financial investigations need to become the norm in the 
context of the fight against organized crime. Authorities 
in Europe may take advantage of the fact that the illicit 
revenues of drug trafficking organizations are ultimately 
generated at retail level (from drug users) and thus originate 
to a large extent from within their own jurisdictions – where 
the opportunity to intervene is bigger. At the same time 
Governments need to take into account the transnational 
aspects of money laundering, especially in the context of 
free movement of people, goods and capital; hence relevant 
national institutions, such as Financial Intelligence Units, 
need to be coordinated so as to act in a concerted manner. 
The capacities, management practices and legal powers of 
asset recovery offices need to be reinforced and Govern-
ments need to consider legal frameworks which favour 
confiscation in the absence of a link to a conviction. 
At this point, cocaine use in Europe can only be expected to 
grow. Demand reduction programmes need to consider the 
ongoing increases in the availability of cocaine. Prevention 
programmes need to alert their audience about cocaine and 
cocaine use patterns and drug treatment programmes must 
be ready for potential increases in cocaine use disorders and 
shifts in patterns of use and harm.
Concerted efforts need to be mustered across the spectrum 
of areas of intervention in supply and demand reduction 
in order to rein in cocaine supply and prevent the further 







G lobal drug markets are complex and dynamic environments. Numerous factors beyond demand and supply determine their develop-ment and evolution, including the emergence 
of new routes, modi operandi or criminal actors. 
The global cocaine market, in particular, has undergone some 
noteworthy developments over recent years. A significant 
expansion of the cultivation of coca bush and the manufacture 
of cocaine has been accompanied by intensified trafficking 
activity reflected in an increase in recent years in the quantities 
seized on entry or during transit from the region of production 
(Colombia, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia) to destination 
markets in Europe. Together with North America, Europe 
continues to be a major consumer market for cocaine, supplied 
by large transatlantic flows originating in the Andean countries. 
Cocaine is the second most commonly used drug in West-
ern and Central Europe, with the most recent estimates 
as of 2021 suggesting some 4.4 million past-year users.1
Repeated multi-ton seizures of cocaine over recent years 
both at origin and destination have especially highlighted 
the significantly increased supply of cocaine to Europe, in 
particular Western and Central Europe. Highly sophisticated 
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) operating on a global 
scale orchestrate the large-scale wholesale supply of cocaine 
to Europe. To keep pace with the expanding production, 
these DTOs have adapted their processes and modi operandi 
in order to traffic increasing quantities of cocaine.
Contemporary DTOs are comprised of complex networks 
of contacts relying on representatives present in source and 
destination countries and using corruption intensively to 
facilitate the transportation of cocaine.
This analysis explores how DTOs originating from Europe 
and Latin America have adapted their business models to 
transport unprecedented amounts of cocaine from Latin 
America to Europe and to ensure the availability of cocaine 
on European markets. These developments include an expan-
sion of the presence of European DTOs in source regions 
in Latin America and of Latin American criminal networks 
in key destination markets in Western and Central Europe.
 
1 UNODC, World Drug Report 2021 (United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.21.XI.8)
This analysis is based on data submitted to 
UNODC by Member States, existing research 
and open source information, including from 
the media, as well as information based on 











Changes in Colombia’s crime 
landscape and implications 
for Europe
F orensic profiling of seizures made in the European Union indicates that Colombia remains, by far, the largest supplier of cocaine available on drug markets in the region.2 Hence, changes in the 
criminal landscape and in the cocaine supply in Colombia 
have the potential to significantly impact cocaine supply 
to Europe and the criminal enterprises orchestrating this 
large-scale supply.
Colombia has long been affected by a complex kaleidoscope 
of groups and organizations operating outside, or on the 
fringes of, the law, and engaged in activities of a criminal, 
military and political nature. While these activities are 
hard to document on the basis of officially reported data, 
they have impacted the social fabric in Colombia and have 
been well documented in the public domain. This section 
triangulates information, in a discerning fashion, from 
various open sources in order to provide a reliable synopsis 
of developments.
From few to many groups 
A number of factors have resulted in significant shifts in 
the criminal landscape in Colombia and a fragmentation 
in the supply of cocaine to wholesale traffickers, notably 
the demobilization of the paramilitary organization Auto-
defensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) in 2006 and, more 
recently, the peace agreement signed between the Colom-
bian government and the armed insurgency group known 
as “FARC” (F.A.R.C.-E.P. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo) in 2016. The AUC had 
arisen in 1997, in the aftermath of the dispersal of the 
Medellin and Calí cartels, through the coalescing of sev-
eral paramilitary groups, and retained a relatively loose 
structure.3 Its dissolution, formalized in 2006, led to the 
formation of numerous smaller groups, often referred to as 
Bandas Criminales (BACRIM), most notably the Urabeños 
(who subsequently expanded into one of the dominant 
criminal groups in Colombia and came to be known 
more widely by the designation Clan del Golfo or, as they 
refer to themselves, AGC, which stands for Autodefensas 
Gaitanistas de Colombia4,5) and the Rastrojos.6 The AUC 
2 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report 2019 (Luxembourg, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2019).
3 Uppsala University, Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, AUC. Available 
at: https://www.ucdp.uu.se/actor/771
4 IInsight Crime, Urabeños, January 6, 2013. Available at: https://insight-
crime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/urabenos-profile/
5 Colombia Reports, Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) / Gulf 
Clan, October 22, 2019. Available at: https://colombiareports.com/agc-gulf-clan/
6 Insight Crime, AUC, November 17, 2015. Available at: https://insight-
crime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/auc-profile/
actively engaged in international trafficking and maintained 
in particular ties with the Italian organized crime group 
’Ndrangheta. The dissolution of the AUC has been credited 
as the trigger which led to ’Ndrangheta losing its monopoly 
in the transatlantic cocaine trade.7 Around the same time,8,9 
there emerged indications of ’Ndrangheta forging links with 
Mexican organized crime groups.10 
The peace agreement in 2016 had a fundamental impact on 
the control of cocaine production and the supply of cocaine 
produced in Colombia. The FARC controlled a propor-
tion of the area under coca bush cultivation and regulated 
access to the cocaine supply available to brokers and inter-
national traffickers. The peace agreement resulted in the end 
of FARC’s integrated command structure and the emergence 
of various splinter groups exercising control over different 
regions and the cocaine production therein. These criminal 
groups, including ex-FARC criminal groups, are heavily 
involved in cocaine production and the wider cocaine illicit 
trade; notable among them is the dissident 1st Front.11 This 
fragmentation multiplied the potential for the formation 
of new alliances and partnerships. The end of FARC domi-
nance also resulted in the resurgence of other armed groups, 
notably the National Liberation Army (ELN),12 especially 
in the northwestern department of Chocó, along with the 
consolidation of its presence in Catatumbo.13 
Another entity which appears to have expanded its role 
since the demobilization of the FARC is La Constru, a 
criminal group formerly allied with the FARC and now 
operating in a collaborative arrangement with a dissident 
faction of the 48th Front, whereby the FARC dissidents 
provide security for coca crops and cocaine processing labo-
ratories, while La Constru handles international contacts, 
including with Mexican cartels, and logistics for drug routes 
to Europe and Central America.14,15 
 
7 Jeremy McDermott, La nueva generación de narcotraficantes colombianos 
post-FARC: “Los invisibles”, InSight Crime, March 14, 2018.
8 “Project Reckoning,” a multi-agency law enforcement effort involving 
authorities in Colombia, Italy, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and United 
States, led to the arrest of over 500 individuals by September 2008, fol-
lowing a 15-month investigation. 
9 United States Federal Bureau of Investigations, 175 Alleged Gulf Cartel 
Members and Associates Arrested in Massive International Law Enforcement 
Operation, 17 September 2008. Available at: https://archives.fbi.gov/
archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/175-alleged-gulf-cartel-members-and-
associates-arrested-in-massive-international-law-enforcement-operation
10 Patrick Corcoran, Italy’s ’Ndrangheta Mafia: A Powerful Ally for the Zeta, 
InSight Crime, August 10, 2011. 
11 InSight Crime, The Criminal Portfolio of the Ex-FARC Mafia, 11 
November 2019. Available at: https://insightcrime.org/investigations/
criminal-portfolio-ex-farc-mafia/
12 Jeremy McDermott, La nueva generación de narcotraficantes colombianos 
post-FARC: “Los invisibles”, InSight Crime, March 14, 2018.
13 Insight Crime, ELN, May 4, 2020. Available at: https://insightcrime.org/
colombia-organized-crime-news/eln-profile/
14 InSight Crime, The Criminal Portfolio of the Ex-FARC Mafia, 11 
November 2019. Available at: https://insightcrime.org/investigations/
criminal-portfolio-ex-farc-mafia/
15 Javier Villalba and Angela Olaya, Allies in High Places Behind ‘La Con-








Overall, these developments have resulted in a further 
fragmentation in the criminal landscape that controls the 
cocaine supply chain in Colombia and may even have 
spurred an increased presence of non-Colombian groups 
intent on procuring cocaine further upstream. The involve-
ment of an increasing number of criminal organizations 
may have translated into the erosion of established monopo-
lies of the dominant suppliers and greater accessibility to 
cocaine supply for a broader range of actors.
in Colombia, the fragmentation into many small 
criminal actors eroded the monopolies enjoyed 
by cocaine suppliers
It has been posited that the dispersal of the dominant actors, 
such as AUC, FARC and Cartel del Norte, may be one of the 
reasons behind the expanded presence of Mexican groups in 
Colombia, as a way to continue to procure large consign-
ments of cocaine which could no longer be provided by 
the smaller actors.16 Moreover, the absence of monolithic 
structures may now preclude any single organization from 
managing the entire spectrum of criminal activity associated 
with the cocaine supply chain, leading to a compartmental-
ization of functions performed by different actors, such as 
guarding plantations, processing of coca leaf into the final 
consumer product, packaging and concealment, transporta-
tion along trafficking routes, money laundering, etc.
the absence of monolithic structures spurred a 
compartmentalization of roles performed by dif-
ferent actors
These market shifts may have had an impact on cocaine 
supply to Europe, by facilitating either new alliances with 
Europe-based DTOs close to production or else the forma-
tion of entirely new supply chains within South America, 
eventually enabling new or expanded roles for Europe-based 
DTOs in the transatlantic procurement and trafficking of 
cocaine. Some of these criminal actors may have gradu-
ated from mid-level supply and distribution in Europe to 
wholesale traffickers operating on an international level.
these changes likely impacted the cocaine supply 
chain to Europe, providing an opportunity for 
smaller organizations to gain access to suppliers
While cocaine oligopolies tended in the past to supply a 
limited number of trusted established wholesale traffickers, 
the removal of centralized control over much of the cocaine 
supply chain and the opening of the cocaine supply market 
in Colombia may now be providing an opportunity for 
smaller international trafficking organizations to gain access 
to supplies and wholesale quantities of cocaine.
16 Jeremy McDermott, La nueva generación de narcotraficantes colombianos 
post-FARC: “Los invisibles”, InSight Crime, March 14, 2018.
The global cocaine trade and 
the role of criminal networks
T he supply of cocaine from production to con-sumers involves various actors operating on different tiers. Cocaine producers and brokers operate in coca cultivation and cocaine-pro-
ducing regions in the main countries of production of 
Colombia, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
Wholesale traffickers ensure the large-scale supply to des-
tination markets and orchestrate trafficking activities using 
various modi operandi transporting cocaine from South 
America to Western and Central Europe. Mid-level sup-
pliers and distributors are restricted in their operations 
typically to domestic or regional destination markets.
Different roles
In coca cultivation regions, the supply chain for cocaine 
involves multiple actors already before the end-product is 
ready for trafficking, mostly in the form of cocaine hydro-
chloride. Coca leaf, coca paste and cocaine base represent 
intermediate products which may be traded either directly 
from farmers to manufacturers of cocaine hydrochloride or 
else through intermediate actors. Individuals who facilitate 
the trade in these intermediary products are referred to as 
rescatistas in Bolivia (Plurinational State of ), chichipatos in 
Colombia and paseros in Peru.17 UNODC estimated that, 
in 2019, 52 per cent of coca growing farmers in Colombia 
sold coca leaf and the remainder processed this to the point 
of coca paste, but the proportion who undertook the pro-
cessing into cocaine base was negligible,18 suggesting that 
processing of coca paste was increasingly being handled by 
actors specialized in this step.19 It should be borne in mind 
that coca leaf may be traded among farmers or bought by 
other actors20 while remaining in proximity to the location 
of cultivation. Moreover, specialized structures called “reoxi-
daderos”, detected already as of 2014, appear to carry out an 
intermediate step of consolidating coca paste or cocaine base, 
of varying quality, from multiple suppliers and producing 
cocaine base of uniform purity, to be later processed into 
cocaine hydrochloride in separate laboratories,21 sometimes 
referred to as “cristalizaderos”. Although “reoxidaderos” tend 
to be found in proximity of the “cristalizaderos”, there are 
some indications of trade of the reoxidized cocaine base 
between different laboratories and different groups.22 
17 UNODC Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme, Colombia (SIMCI).
18 By way of comparison, in 2008 UNODC estimated that 39 per cent of 
farmers sold fresh coca leaf, 24 per cent processed coca leaf to the point 
of coca paste and 37 per cent undertook processing into cocaine base. 
See: UNODC and Government of Colombia, Colombia Coca Cultiva-
tion Survey Report 2008, June 2009.
19 UNODC and Government of Colombia, Monitoreo de Territorios afecta-
dos por coltivos ilícitos 2019, July 2020.
20 Ibid.













These activities are typically subject to territorial control 
by criminal networks and armed groups. For example, 
UNODC estimated that farmers in Colombia paid illegal 
armed groups some 33 million USD in “taxes” on transac-
tions of coca paste or cocaine base in 2019.23
On the other hand, brokers based in Latin America typically 
act as interlocutors between these groups and international 
DTOs seeking to source bulk quantities of cocaine for 
trafficking to Europe and other global destinations. Unof-
ficial open source reporting suggests that such brokers may 
supply multiple buyers and act independently, albeit in 
collaboration with the powerful organized crime groups 
who are their clients. They tend to leverage a network of 
contacts while remaining discreet and taking precautions 
in their communication, which they sometimes conduct 
on a strict one-to-one basis. 24,25
The global drugs trade is dominated by dynamics of 
cooperation and competition between various DTOs and 
criminal actors. The wholesale bulk supply of cocaine heav-
ily depends on close cooperation between cocaine producers 
and their organizations based in Latin America, brokers 
and internationally operating DTOs, including groups 
originating from Europe, that orchestrate the large-scale 
trafficking of cocaine from source regions to destination 
markets, sometimes in multi-ton shipments.
23 UNODC and Government of Colombia, Monitoreo de Territorios afecta-
dos por coltivos ilícitos 2019, July 2020.
24 Lorenzo Bodrero, Cocaine brokers revealed, Organized Crime and Cor-
ruption Reporting Project, September 2013.
25 See also: Roberto Saviano, ZeroZeroZero (Milan, Feltrinelli Editore, 
2013).
Factors influencing supply routes 
and partnerships along supply 
chains
The formation of alliances, collaboration between different 
drug trafficking groups and consolidation of supply chains 
is influenced by numerous factors, including geography but 
also less obvious aspects such as economic ties and patterns 
of legitimate trade, historical ties and linguistic affinity. 
For example, the very large quantities of containers going 
through major ports such as Rotterdam (Netherlands), 
Antwerp (Belgium), Hamburg (Germany), Valencia and 
Algeciras (Spain)26 with legitimate goods render them vul-
nerable to the infiltration of illegal shipments. 
Historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties, such as 
those between Portugal and the rest of the lusophone 
world, or Spain and Spanish-speaking countries in South 
America, may also facilitate links of a criminal nature. 
From a geographic standpoint, these two countries occupy 
almost equivalent positions on the route from South 
America to Europe, yet an analysis of the provenance of 
individual cocaine seizures made in Portugal and Spain 
over 2007-2011 showed that Brazil, together with luso-
phone countries in Africa, consistently accounted for 
26 These ports are all known to be significant points of entry for cocaine 
entering Europe. Based on a global ranking of container ports, produced 
by Lloyd’s list on the basis of commercial container throughput, as of 
2019 they constituted 5 of the top 6 European ports, the other one 
being Piraeus (Greece). Source: Lloyd’s List, One Hundred Ports 2020, 
2020. Available at: http://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/
one-hundred-container-ports-2020/port-data#rankings 







more than half (59-83 per cent in each of these years) 
of such seizure cases in Portugal, while Spanish-speaking 
countries in the Americas accounted the overwhelming 
majority (74-91 per cent) of seizure cases in Spain during 
the same time period.27 
Kinship, migration and trust 
Alliances may take time to develop and consolidate, as 
criminal groups gradually gain trust in their counterparts, 
a process sometimes aided by family ties or a history of 
prior collaboration. For example, Belgium reported that 
collaboration between criminal groups operating in Ant-
werp and in the Netherlands were facilitated by ethnic 
and family ties.28
Similarly, the Italian descent of one of the high-level lead-
ers29 of the Colombian armed group Autodefensas Unidas 
de Colombia may have facilitated a “relationship of trust”30 
between cocaine traffickers operating in Colombia and 
in Italy. One academic study on the transplantation of 
organized crime groups31 has argued that blood ties were a 
key factor which enabled the ’Ndrangheta, whose system 
of recruitment is based mainly on kinship, to expand more 
successfully in comparison with other criminal groups 
which used a “meritocratic” recruitment system based on 
skills and experience. The same study concludes that, while 
migration is not a sufficient condition for the transplanta-
tion of mafia groups, it may contribute to the “supply-side” 
aspect and, when coupled with “demand-side” aspects such 
as illegal employment and the absence of state protection, 
the conditions may arise for a successful transplantation 
of an organized crime group.
a system of recruitment based on family 
ties enabled the ’Ndrangheta to expand 
successfully
A history of collaboration may also be instrumental for 
the penetration of markets by organized crime groups. 
There are indications of a recent incursion of some Mexi-
can groups operating directly in coca cultivation regions 
27 UNODC, World Drug Report 2013 (United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.13.XI.6). 
28 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from Belgium 
for 2019.
29 Salvatore Mancuso was the son of an Italian immigrant in Colombia, 
originally from Sapri, Italy (province of Salerno). He grew up in a 
Colombian town with a significant Italian community and eventually 
became a leader of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia. See: Andrea 
Amato, L’impero della cocaína (Rome, Newton Compton editori, 
2011).
30 Mario Spanguolo, Procuratore Capo della Repubblica, Vibo Valentia. 
Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia, Catanzaro. Quoted in: Andrea 
Amato, L’impero della cocaína (Rome, Newton Compton editori, 
2011).
31 Federico Varese, How Mafias Migrate: The Case of the ‘Ndrangheta in 
Northern Italy. Law and Society Review, Volume 4, No. 2, pp 411-444. 
June 2006.
in Colombia.32,33,34,35 Their long history of collaboration 
with Colombian traffickers, intimate knowledge of the 
cocaine illicit trade and common language likely afforded 
them significant advantages in reaching so deep into the 
cocaine supply chain. 
Another example of a history of collaboration enabling 
criminal groups to expand their activities is illustrated by 
the current ability of Albanian-speaking groups to operate 
within Italy in cooperation with Italian organized crime 
groups,36 a development which may have been in part 
facilitated by their long-standing established role in sup-
plying heroin37 and cannabis herb to their counterparts 
in Italy.38 
32 UNODC and Government of Colombia, Monitoreo de Territorios afecta-
dos por coltivos ilícitos 2019, July 2020.
33 Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia, XXVI Informe del Defensor del Pueblo al 
Congreso de la República. Parte I – Informe Analitico, July 2019.
34 PARES Fundación Paz y Reconciliación, Carteles Mexicanos en Colombia, 
otro leño encendido, 16 August 2019. Available at: https://pares.com.
co/2019/08/16/carteles-mexicanos-en-colombia-otro-leno-encendido/
35 El Universal, Mexican Drug lord arrested in Colombia, 23 September 
2019.
36 Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga, Italy, Relazione Annuale 
2019, 2019.
37 Europol, 71 Arrested as police smash heroin trafficking ring in Italy, 21 
October 2013. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/
news/71-arrested-police-smash-heroin-trafficking-ring-in-italy












Recent developments in  
cocaine trafficking to Europe
diversification of the criminal actors helped to 
make transatlantic cocaine trafficking more 
competitive and more efficient
V arious indicators suggest that, in recent years, developments in the landscape of international criminal actors involved in the trafficking of cocaine may have contributed, along with other 
factors, to making transatlantic cocaine trafficking more 
competitive and thus more efficient. An increase in the 
number and the diversity of actors involved, coupled with 
an increase in supply, may have led to the development 
of new and more direct routes to the main distribu-
tion hubs in Europe. This in turn likely contributed to 
increasing the availability of cocaine in Europe, as con-
firmed for example by increases not only in seizures but 
also in purity levels. These appear to have caught up with 
purity levels in the United States as of 2012 and have 
followed a very similar trend since then. One study has 
also pointed out a significant drop in wholesale price of 
cocaine in the Netherlands beginning around 2012 (the 
same time when the above-mentioned development in 
purity levels occurred), attributing this to the role of Alba-
nian-speaking traffickers in procuring cocaine directly at 
source and undercutting the prevailing price at the time. 39 
 
Customs seizure data indicate that cocaine continued to be 
seized in large quantities in 2020, notably at seaports. In 
addition to the established major ports, secondary smaller 
seaports are increasingly used as entry points to traffic 
cocaine to the EU.40 
These developments are likely linked to the emergence of 
new and more direct routes as well as new actors involved 
in the trafficking chain. For example, France reported a link 
between an increase in cocaine reaching consumers and the 
emergence of distribution channels through French Gui-
ana.41 A clear example, from media sources, of the use of 
direct routes could be observed in November 2017, when 
a collaboration between French and US law enforcement 
authorities stopped a pattern of cocaine shipments trafficked 
from Colombia to Biarritz, France, on charter flights.42 A 
similar modality was detected in February 2018, when British 
authorities intercepted cocaine being flown from Colombia 
to the private airport of Farnborough, United Kingdom, on 
39 Tony Saggers, An assessment of the extent of Albanian(-speaking) organised 
crime groups involved in drug supply in the European Union: characteristics, 
role and the level of influence, EMCDDA Background paper, 2019.
40 Europol information based on intelligence.
41 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from France for 
2018.
42 El Tiempo, Los vuelos chárter colombianos que llenan de coca a Europa, 25 
November 2017.
private flights.43 The use of private planes was also on display 
in the case of operation Familia in 2019 (see box on page 24). 
In November 2019, Spanish authorities recovered 3 tons 
of cocaine from a semi-submersible vessel which had been 
scuttled off the Galician coast; while the exact itinerary of the 
vessel is unknown, this may point to a new modality to source 
cocaine directly from Colombia.44 Media sources suggest that 
the submersible was made in the rainforests of southeastern 
Colombia, in a shipyard the vicinity of Leticia, a major port 
on the Amazon river located at the juncture of the Brazilian, 
Colombian and Peruvian border. In February 2021, Spanish 
police, in the context of a broad operation targeting drug 
trafficking, detected in a warehouse in Monda (province of 
Malaga) a similar vessel which was under construction and 
which was apparently intended for cocaine trafficking.45
While some of the cocaine reaching Europe continues to 
flow through West Africa or along the Atlantic coast of 
Africa, it appears that significant quantities of cocaine are 
arriving directly in North Africa (as opposed to being trans-
shipped in West Africa) in maritime shipments. Moroccan 
authorities reported that, in November 2019, a consign-
ment of 476 kg of cocaine coming from Colombia was 
seized from a boat at Temara (south of Rabat on the Atlantic 
coast).46 In December 2018, media outlets reported that 
43 El Tiempo, Bitácora secreta del ‘narcojet’ que salió de Bogotá lleno de 
cocaína, February 2018.
44 UNODC, World Drug Report 2020 (United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.20.XI.6).
45 El País, La narcolancha semisumergible de ‘El Cojo’, una creación ‘made in 
Spain’, 12 March 2021.







FIg. 2 Cocaine purity at retail level, Europe and the United States, 2005-2018
Notes: European countries were selected on the basis of availability of data and sample size. Imputations and adjustments at national level used to address data gaps (up 
to three consecutive years) and breaks in series. Data for “crack” are not included. 
Source: United States: Office of National Drug Control Policy; Europe: EMCDDA Statistical Bulletin 2020 (purity data); UNODC, 
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Interpreting drug seizure data 
The quantity of drugs seized in a given timespan 
may be influenced by two main factors, namely 
the available supply of the drug in the illicit market 
and the effectiveness of interdiction efforts by law 
enforcement agencies.
In order to disentangle, from drug seizure data, 
information on trends in the availability of drugs in 
a given country or region, it is important to triangu-
late seizure data with other supply-side indicators, 
such as production estimates, purity levels, or 
seizure data in other countries/regions, or even 
demand-side data such as survey-based estimates 
of prevalence of use or wastewater-based con-
sumption trends. 
Moreover, to the extent that the priorities, effi-
ciency and resources of law enforcement agencies 
develop independently in different countries, the 
trends driven by law enforcement aspects may to 
a certain extent “cancel out” when considering 
aggregate seizure data at global or regional level. 
Thus, information on drug seizures is one of the 
key elements in understanding drug markets, espe-











FIg. 3 Cocaine seizures in Western and Central Europe and in the United States, in comparison with 
global cocaine manufacture, 2005-2019





























Global cocaine manufacture (right axis) Cocaine seizures in Western and Central Europe (left axis)













































seven individuals were arrested in Morocco in connection 
with the seizure of 1 ton of cocaine. The individuals were 
suspected of belonging to a criminal group which trafficked 
the cocaine by sea on a merchant vessel from Latin America 
to Moroccan waters, from where it was transported to El 
Jadida, in the vicinity of Casablanca, by a fishing vessel.47
Some evidence suggests the movement of appreciable 
quantities of cocaine between the European and North 
American markets. For example, French authorities 
assessed that, in 2018, 9 per cent of cocaine salts seized 
in France were intended for Canada. On the other hand, 
some seizure cases reported in the media point to the pos-
sibility of cocaine trafficked through the United States to 
Europe.48 There also appear to be instances of groups based 
in transit countries in Central America and the Caribbean 
who supply both of these consumer markets.49,50,51
47 Morocco World News, Morocco Busts International Drug Network, Seizes 
1 Ton of Cocaine, 8 December 2018.
48 NBC10 Philadelphia, 15,500 Kilos of Cocaine, Worth $1 Billion Officials 
Say, Seized at Philadelphia Port; Crew Charged, 18 June 2019.
49 BBC Monitoring Americas, Dom Rep drugs kingpin sent ‘tonnes of cocaine’ 
to US, Europe, 21 August 2019.
50 United States Department of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Dominican Repub-
lic- Based Peralta Drug Trafficking Organization Under the Kingpin Act, 20 August 
2019. Available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm755
51 United States Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Georgia, International 
drug traffickers plead guilty to smuggling heroin through Atlanta airport, 6 
Belgium as a major gateway to the 
Netherlands and Europe
While the Iberian Peninsula, in particular the Galician 
coast in northwestern Spain, has long accounted for an 
important share of cocaine reaching Europe, seizure data 
point to an increase in the relative importance of quantities 
entering through Belgium, notably through Antwerp. It 
appears that in recent years these quantities also increasingly 
reached Belgium–via maritime shipments–directly from 
the source country of Colombia (as opposed to transit via 
other countries). However, by 2019 Colombia had been 
replaced by Brazil as the foremost country of departure 
from which cocaine was reaching Belgium, with seizures 
of cocaine from containers having departed from Colom-
bia falling from 25 tons in 2018 to 10.5 tons in 2019.52 
Cocaine seizures in Antwerp continue to increase overall, 
reaching at least 65.6 tons in 2020.53
the majority of cocaine reaching Antwerp is 
likely intended for organizations operating out 
of the Netherlands
August 2019. Available at: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/interna-
tional-drug-traffickers-plead-guilty-smuggling-heroin-through-atlanta-airport
52 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from Belgium for 2019.
53 World Customs Organization, Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices for 







FIg. 4 Cocaine seized at seaports by customs authorities of countries in Western and Central Europe, 
quantities seized in 2020 (or latest available data*) and trend in comparison with 2019
*For French seaports, data refers to 2019. Data for 2020 were not available.
Note: The trend was designated as a “strong increase” (respectively, “strong decrease”) if the quantity seized in 2020 was at least double (respectively, at most one half) of 
the quantity seized in 2019. Otherwise the trend was designated as a “moderate increase” (respectively, “moderate decrease”) if the quantity in 2020 increased (respectively, 
decreased) by more than 5 per cent in comparison with 2019. The situation where the variation was within 5 per cent (considered “stable”) did not occur.
For some ports, data were available for only one of the years 2019 and 2020; hence the trend in 2020 could not be determined. The trend for the corresponding seaports is 
shown as “indeterminable.”
 













Quantity of cocaine seized
Area of circle is proportional 
to quantity seized
Trend in 2020
The majority of cocaine reaching Antwerp is likely intended 
for organizations operating out of the Netherlands,54 from 
where the cocaine is further distributed to other European 
destinations. Belgium reported that groups of Moroccan 
and Albanian ethnicity, who are involved in the extrac-
tion of cocaine from the port, have expanded their role 
in the procurement of cocaine and the development of 
contacts in South America.55 Groups of Moroccan eth-
nicity also maintained close ties across the border with 
the Netherlands, sometimes based on family ties, while 
Albanian-speaking groups were involved in the exportation 
54 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from Belgium for 
2019.
55 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from Belgium for 
2019.
of cocaine onwards to Italy and Albania.56 The expanded 
role of Albanian-speaking groups in the provision of cocaine 
to Europe has been credited with a decrease in wholesale 
price, from 2012 onwards, in the Netherlands and hence 
downstream in other European countries.57 It is possible 
that the same development is reflected at retail level in the 
alignment, also from 2012 onwards, of European purity 
levels with those in the United States.
56 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from Belgium for 
2019.
57 Tony Saggers, An assessment of the extent of Albanian(-speaking) organised 
crime groups involved in drug supply in the European Union: characteristics, 











FIg. 5 Distribution of cocaine seizure quantities in Europe, by country of seizure (two-year moving 
averages), 2000-2019
Source: UNODC, responses to the annual report questionnaire.
FIg. 6 Quantity of cocaine seized at Antwerp port, Belgium, 2013-2020
*Since the source for 2020 data was distinct from that for 2013-2019, the figure for 2020 may not be directly comparable to prior years. In particular the figure for 2020 does 
not include cocaine seized in consignments of less than 100 grams (if any) and thus potentially underestimates the true quantity, if any such cases did occur. However, a 
comparison of data for 2018-19 (for which data were available from both sources) suggests that any methodological discrepancies were negligible, as the variation for these 
two years was around 1 per cent or less.
Sources: 2013-2019: Federale Overheidsdienst Financien, Belgium (2013-2019); 2020: World Customs Organization, Regional Intelligence 



























































































Entry channels into southwestern 
Europe
Morocco, which has registered an increase in cocaine sei-
zures in recent years,58 reported that the more important 
quantities were seized on the maritime route, arriving 
directly from Latin America.59 Morocco also reported, 
among at least 171 persons60 recorded for drug trafficking 
offences in 2018, 10 individuals with French national-
ity and Moroccan origin and 6 individuals with Belgian 
nationality and Moroccan origin.61 
Some limited evidence suggests that the established supply 
chains used to channel cannabis resin from Morocco 
through Spain to the rest of Europe, notably the Neth-
erlands, may have been adapted to also traffic cocaine 
intended for distributors in the Netherlands.
French authorities also reported that, given the high profit-
ability of cocaine trafficking, certain networks specialized 
in cannabis trafficking were, as of 2018, also investing in 
cocaine acquired outside Metropolitan France, in particu-
lar overseas, or in the European distribution hubs of the 
Netherlands and Spain.62
The drug trafficking milieu in Spain appears relatively 
complex, with the involvement of a multitude of actors. 
58 Annual cocaine seizures in Morocco averaged 1.9 tons over 2016-19 and 
198kg over 2012-2015.
59 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from Morocco for 2018.
60 The total is based only on the top nationalities and therefore represents a 
partial figure.
61 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from Morocco for 2018.
62 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from France for 2018.
FIg. 7 Estimated proportion of seized cocaine 
entering Belgium directly from Colombia, 
as reported by Belgium, 2011-2019
* Although Belgium responded to the relevant question in the annual report question-
naire for 2014 and 2019, data specific to Colombia for these years were unavailable 
because Colombia was not among the top three countries from which cocaine 
entered Belgium. However, this does not mean that the value for Colombia was 
zero. The range shown represents the possible values for Colombia, between 0 
per cent and the value reported for the third ranked country (in both 2014 and 2019 
approximately 14 per cent). 
Sources: UNODC, responses to the annual report questionnaire 
from Belgium for 2011-2019. 
According to a Spanish prosecutor specialized on corrup-
tion and organized crime in Spain,63 the Italian criminal 
networks ’Ndrangheta, Camorra and Cosa Nostra continue 
to have a presence in Spain, but Nigerian, Albanian, and 
Russian groups also play an active role in drug traffick-
ing. Groups operating in Spain–including Galician groups 
but also brokers64 and organized crime groups with links 
to Italy–have long collaborated with Colombian traffick-
ers. Media sources have also documented the presence of 
British cocaine traffickers in Spain,65 and also suggest that 
Dutch groups are important players;66 in some instances 
63 Magistrate Jose Grinda Gonzales, reported in: Il Fatto Quotidiano, 
Spagna, il porto franco delle mafie in un Paese senza mafia - Con l’ombra 
del Cremlino, July 2017. Available at: https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/
longform/mafie-europa/focus/spagna/
64 For example, Roberto Pannunzi, allegedly a broker supplying both 
’Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra, was arrested in Spain in April 2004 and, 
having fled from justice, was arrested once more in Colombia in July 
2013. See: El Mundo, Detenidos en Majadahonda tres miembros de la 
mafia calabresa, 5 April 2004; James Bargent, Italian Mafia Cocaine 
Broker Arrested in Colombia, Insight Crime, 8 July 2013.
65 The Local, Police swoop in on British drug kingpin in luxury Costa del Sol 
villa, 11 December 2015.
66 The Local, Spanish police seize massive cocaine haul in banana cargo, 25 
October 2018.














Dismantlement of Netherlands’ 
largest cocaine laboratory,  
August 2020
In August 2020, the Dutch police dismantled a 
laboratory equipped to extract very large quanti-
ties of cocaine from carrier material. The facility 
was estimated to have the capacity to yield 
150-200 kg of cocaine per day. A total of 17 
suspects–including 13 of Colombian national-
ity–were arrested.
The facility was located in a former riding school 
in Nijveen, 20 km northeast of Amsterdam. 
Police said they found tens of thousands of 
litres of chemicals and 100 kg of cocaine. The 
cocaine was found in base form, suggesting 
that it was to be further processed into cocaine 
hydrochloride. 
In connection with this case, 120 tons of “car-
rier material” were also discovered during two 
other police raids at warehouses in Apeldoorn 
and Elshout, in the centre and the south of the 
Netherlands. According to open source report-
ing, the relatively unrefined product of coca 
paste may have been camouflaged in the load 
of charcoal prior to departure, to be processed 
into cocaine on arrival.
Sources: Dutch police, Grootste cocaïnewasserij ooit ont-
manteld, 11 August 2020. Available at: https://www.
politie.nl/nieuws/2020/augustus/11/gigantisch-cocaine-
lab-ontmanteld-en-17-verdachten-aangehouden.html
Douwe Den Held, Arrests, seizures show Colombians process-











collaboration between these two types of groups has also 
been reported.67 
Colombian nationals play a significant role in the supply 
chain on the Spanish mainland. Some of their activities may 
also involve secondary extraction of cocaine in Europe. In 
February 2020, media outlets reported that Spanish police 
concluded an investigation which resulted in the arrest of 
39 suspects, of whom 31 were Colombian (some described 
as “former Colombian cartel bosses based in Alicante”), the 
detection of 5 cocaine processing facilities within Spain and 
the seizure of 1 ton of cocaine (in multiple instances).68 
In some cases, Spain may also simply serve as a staging 
post for cocaine traffickers even if the drugs do not actu-
ally reach Spanish territory. In May 2020, for example, an 
investigation led by Spanish police reported in the media 
led to the dismantlement of an international operation, 
apparently led by a Colombian national with links to Spain, 
whereby cocaine was impregnated in cardboard boxes before 
departure from South America and retrieved in Europe at 
secondary extraction facilities in Bulgaria and the Nether-
lands. Individuals with specialized chemical skills travelled 
from Colombia to Spain and subsequently onwards to 
Bulgaria and the Netherlands specifically to perform the 
extraction step. The operation resulted in the arrest of 18 
people in Spain, Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Colombia 
and the seizure of 1 ton of cocaine in Bulgaria which had 
entered through Greece.69,70
Some criminal cells in Spain may operate directly on behalf 
of Colombian drug trafficking organizations and may carry 
out the functions of ensuring payment and managing 
deliveries. Such cells have been linked in unofficial open 
sources to several Colombian groups, notably the “Oficina 
de Envigado” and the Urabeños (also referred to as the Clan 
del Golfo).71 One such cell was allegedly responsible for 30 
kidnappings and hundreds of incidents of extortion against 
traffickers with outstanding debts with suppliers.72
Spanish authorities assessed that, in 2018, the most common 
means of trafficking cocaine into Spain was by way of ship-
ping containers, using the “rip-off’ method.73 The largest 
quantities of cocaine were seized in the Provinces of Cádiz, 
Las Palmas and Málaga and were primarily of shipments 
seized at ports. A total of 58 containers containing 19.5 
tons of cocaine (40 per cent of the total) were intercepted, 
67 The Local, Spain busts Anglo-Dutch drug gang seizing three tonnes of 
cocaine, 5 January 2016.
68 El País, Detenidos en Alicante antiguos capos de los cárteles de droga colom-
bianos, 26 February 2020.
69 The Guardian, Smugglers impregnated cardboard with cocaine, Spanish 
police say, 14 May 2020.
70 Agence France Presse, Spanish Police Say Drug Ring Smuggled Cocaine-
laced Cardboard, May 13, 2020.
71 Jeremy McDermott, Another Colombia Mafia Boss Arrested in Spain, 
Insight Crime, 21 July 2014.
72 El Tiempo, España deporte al ‘Inválido’, capo del microtráfico en Risaralda, 
12 December 2014.
73 Thirteenth Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agen-
cies, Europe, Lisbon, 2–5 July 2019. Country report by Spain.
together with 12 vessels transporting 11.8 tons of cocaine 
(24 per cent of the total) and 2,097 kg seized from couriers 
(4 per cent of the total). The largest seizure was made in the 
port of Algeciras (Cádiz) and involved a container arriving 
from Colombia that contained 7.3 tons of cocaine.
Media reports suggest that the activities of Galician-based 
groups continue, and some of these actors have exploited 
the contacts established over time with Colombian groups 
in order to become middlemen facilitating the movement 
of cocaine to destinations such as Italy and the Netherlands 
(aside from Spain). Moreover, these groups appear to have 
the ability to use countries in North and West Africa as 
staging posts for cocaine shipments, storing the drugs until 
buyers have been identified in Europe.74,75,76 
74 El País, Los nuevos amos de la coca en Galicia, 6 April 2019.
75 El País, Sito Miñanco traficaba con cocaína a Italia, Holanda y Albania, 7 
February 2018.
76 El País, Arrest of 85-year-old drug lord confirms return of historical gangs to 
Galicia, 9 August 2018.
Cocaine smuggling from Brazil 
to Spain, 2020
In February 2020, 14 members of a DTO were 
arrested for cocaine trafficking by Spanish 
authorities with the support of EUROPOL.
The arrests were the result of a yearlong oper-
ation, which began after 1,413 kg of cocaine 
were found at a company near Barcelona in 
December 2018. The drugs had been sent from 
Brazil, hidden in boxes of A4 paper, and were 
found when an employee accidently dropped 
one of the boxes. The investigation identified 
that the suspects were part of a criminal net-
work smuggling drugs from Brazil.
In addition to cocaine trafficking, the suspects 
were also arrested in relation to money launder-
ing, as they had created a business structure 
involving different companies in order to launder 
the proceeds. They also used ‘money mules’ 
to make frequent small cash deposits at dif-
ferent banks.
Source: Europol Press Release (2020), 14 Arrests in Spain 









European actors in Latin 
America and challenges to  
established supply chains
C riminal networks originating in Europe and pri-marily composed of nationals of European states have long been active in the transcontinental cocaine trade, procuring significant amounts 
of cocaine from suppliers in Latin America and organiz-
ing its transportation to Europe. These criminal networks 
primarily operate at the wholesale supply level and do not 
get involved in the retail distribution of cocaine on Euro-
pean drug markets.
These European networks orchestrate the transportation of 
cocaine from Latin America to Europe, typically relying 
on front companies and corruption targeting ship crews, 
port workers and officials. Some criminal networks have 
systematically infiltrated internationally operating freight 
haulage companies for years, which has provided them with 
access to trafficking means and to key European ports.77 
Data from South American countries on persons brought 
into formal contact with the police on cocaine trafficking 
charges, while not necessarily representative of high-level 
trafficking activity, do bring out the relative importance of 
Spanish and Italian nationals, which were the most promi-
nent among European nationals over the period 2016-18 
(while Spanish and Dutch nationals were the most promi-
nent over 2006-08).78 
Based on a long-term analysis of supply-side indicators, 
such as seizure data and purity, it appears that, at least since 
2009, the flow of cocaine from Latin America to Europe has 
been steady, with little interruption to supply, despite occa-
sional large-scale seizures. As documented in open sources, 
well-established and powerful criminal networks such as 
the Italian ’Ndrangheta have been controlling trafficking 
flows of cocaine, acting as wholesale suppliers to mid-level 
distributors based in Europe, who lacked the contacts and 
capabilities to organize the trafficking of the drug from 
source to destination markets.79,80 While these criminal 
networks remain very active in the wholesale supply of 
cocaine from South America to Europe, their dominant 
position is increasingly being challenged by smaller and 
emerging trafficking organizations originating from Europe.
The established European criminal networks mentioned 
above exercised a competitive advantage by means of their 
77 Europol information based on intelligence.
78 UNODC, responses to the annual report questionnaire from reporting 
countries in South America for 2016-2018 and 2006-08.
79 CNN, Inside Europe’s most powerful mafia -- the ‘Ndrangheta’, 10 Decem-
ber 2018. 
80 Paul Gootenberg, Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug 
(Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, December 2008).
close collaboration with Colombian cartels and other pro-
ducers in Latin America, in particular via their established 
presence in Brazil.81 Prior to the recent changes, these sophis-
ticated Italian mafia-type organizations benefited from a 
comparatively stable criminal landscape in cocaine-produc-
ing countries, especially Colombia, and in Europe, enabling 
their criminal businesses to grow and mature over time.82
European criminal networks like the ’Ndrang-
heta used to exercise a competitive advantage 
through close ties with producers…
These Italian mafia-type organizations and other estab-
lished DTOs originating in Europe, such as British83 and 
Spanish groups, still maintain ties to Colombian producers 
and continue to organize the trafficking of large quantities 
of cocaine to Europe.84 There are recent reports in open 
sources of representatives of European criminal organiza-
tions being present in laboratories in Colombia in order to 
verify the purity of cocaine prior to shipment.85 
However, these well-established criminal organizations are 
increasingly challenged by other European DTOs, who may 
have previously relied on established DTOs to supply them 
with cocaine. A new type of DTOs—primarily originat-
ing from the Balkan region—have increasingly challenged 
existing wholesale trafficking monopolies controlling the 
flow of cocaine from Latin America to Europe. 
…but the fragmentation in Colombia may have 
opened the door to new actors
The fragmentation and diversification of the criminal 
landscape in Colombia may have disrupted the previously 
successful business model of monopolized access to cocaine 
in Colombia for established European criminal networks, 
such as the Italian ’Ndrangheta, and provided the space for 
a broader range of emerging European DTOs to expand 
their contacts and relationships with cocaine producers in 
the source regions of Latin America. It seems that, while 
established criminal networks such as the ’Ndrangheta 
still dominate the wholesale supply of cocaine from Latin 
America to Europe, they no longer maintain an oligopoly 
and have been unable to deny other European DTOs entry 
to the wholesale market for cocaine in Latin America.
Groups such as Albanian, Belgian, British, Dutch, French, 
Irish, Moroccan, Serbian, Spanish and Turkish DTOs appear 
to be gaining greater shares of the cocaine market in Europe.86 
81 Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade – Scope, Dimensions, 
Impact, and Response, RAND Corporation, 2011.
82 Phil Williams, Transnational Criminal Networks, in: The Future of 
Terror, Crime and Militancy, RAND Corporation, 2001.
83 See also: The Mirror, Colombian drug cartel’s British ‘kingpin in £350m 
cocaine trafficking gang’ is captured, 1 September 2018.
84 Europol information based on intelligence.
85 Jeremy McDermott, La nueva generación de narcotraficantes colombianos 
post-FARC: “Los invisibles”, InSight Crime, 14 March 2018.











While traditional mafia-type groups, such as ’Ndrangheta and 
Camorra87,88,89, continue to play a leading role, new actors 
are emerging, especially criminal groups from the Balkan 
region, which are increasingly present in South America. 90 
A broad range of European DTOs is now involved in the 
trafficking of cocaine including some originating from 
Albania, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom.91 Less prominent cocaine trafficking DTOs also 
originate from Ireland, Poland and Serbia.92 However, con-
87 According to Italian authorities, the Camorra makes use of a network 
of international contacts, notably in the Netherlands, Spain and South 
America, for the purposes of cocaine trafficking. See: Direzione Centrale 
per i Servizi Antidroga, Italy, Relazione Annuale 2019, 2019. 
88 In 2019, Italian authorities seized 537kg of cocaine at the port of Genova 
from a container originating in Colombia and destined for the port of Napoli. 
See: Direzione Central per i Servizi Antidroga. Relazione Annuale 2020.
89 An international investigation triggered in 2018 exposed a collaboration 
between the Camorra and ’Ndrangheta in an attempt to traffic cocaine 
from Brazil to Italy via Côte d’Ivoire. See: Teller Report, Ivory Coast: an 
international network of cocaine traffickers dismantled – RFI, 8 June 2019. 
EMCDDA, Recent changes in Europe’s cocaine market - Results from an 
EMCDDA trendspotter study, December 2018.
90 EMCDDA, Recent changes in Europe’s cocaine market - Results from an 
EMCDDA trendspotter study, December 2018.
91 Europol information based on intelligence.
92 Europol information based on intelligence.
FIg. 8 Top foreign¹ nationalities of persons recorded for cocaine trafficking offences in South America,² 
2016-18 averages³
1 Persons recorded within their country of nationality are not included.
2 Based on data from the following 7 countries: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
3 Not all reporting countries provided data for each of 2016, 2017 and 2018. For each reporting country, averages are based only on years for which data are available.
4 Based only on data for the top ten nationalities reported per drug by a given country in a given year. Number in brackets denotes number of reporting countries which 
identified the given nationality among the top ten for at least one of the years 2016, 2017 and 2018. Since a given nationality may be in the top 10 in one country but not in 
another, or during a certain year but not in other years, the absolute values shown here are likely an underestimate.
Sources: UNODC, responses to the annual report questionnaire from reporting countries in South America for 2016-18
sidering the scale of cocaine trafficking activities to Europe 
it is likely that a much wider range of DTOs originating 
from all over Europe and beyond are involved in the cocaine 
illicit trade. 
Drug traffickers originating from the Western Balkan region 
are increasingly active in procuring large amounts of cocaine 
at source in Latin America. In order to facilitate this busi-
ness, they maintain established residents in Latin America, 
either in the countries of production or countries used as 
major transit and departure points on the trafficking routes 
to Europe.93 The increased importance of criminal networks 
originating from the Western Balkans is also borne out by 
arrestee information collected on a case-by-case basis, which 
shows that, while nationals of some of the countries in this 
region may not account for a large number of arrestees, 
they tend to be involved in larger-scale trafficking. 
Albanian-speaking and Serbo-Croatian- speak-
ing groups are increasingly active in procuring 
large amounts of cocaine at source 
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The ’Ndrangheta presence in Latin America
As well documented in open sources, the Calabrian 
mafia organization ’Ndrangheta has long been 
involved in the trafficking of cocaine from Latin 
America to Europe.a Evidence of links between Ital-
ian criminal networks and DTOs in Latin America, 
notably the Calí cartel, existed since the early 1990s.b 
These links have continued to thrive and have driven 
much of the cocaine supply to Europe since then.
The ’Ndrangheta counts among the most estab-
lished organized crime networks operating 
wholesale supply networks of cocaine from South 
America to Europe and North America, using rep-
resentatives present in the region to negotiate 
purchases, arrange and supervise shipments and 
oversee payments.c
In order to facilitate this high-volume trafficking 
activity, ’Ndrangheta maintained a well-connected 
presence in Latin America close to or in countries of 
production and departure.d High-profile law enforce-
ment operations, such as Operation Pollino, have 
targeted the organization and its Latin American 
presence.e,f This operation confirmed the wide 
reach of the ’Ndrangheta and brought to light a 
network spanning South America, northern Europe 
and Turkey, based around the Locride clans of the 
Pelle-Vottari’s of San Luca, the Ietto’s of Natile di 
Careri and the Ursini’s of Gioiosa Ionica.g
The presence of ‘Ndrangheta operatives is focused 
in countries of production as well as crucial 
countries of departure. In recent years, Brazil has 
emerged as a key departure point for cocaine traf-
ficked from Latin America to Europe. Consequently, 
the ’Ndrangheta has established a presence in the 
country in order to ensure the flow of cocaine to 
destination markets.h
a Chalk, P. The Latin American Drug Trade – Scope, Dimensions, Impact, 
and Response, RAND Corporation. 2011.
b Williams, P. “Transnational Criminal Organizations and International 
Security”, in: In Athena’s Camp, RAND Corporation. 1997.
c The Times. Rise of the ’Ndrangheta: how the feared Calabrian mafia has 
reached the UK, 2 December 2018.
d Williams, P. “Transnational Criminal Networks”, in: The Future of 
Terror, Crime and Militancy, RAND Corporation. 2001.
e Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. Police Arrest 90 
Alleged Mafia Members in Europe and Latin America. December 2018. 
Accessible at: https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/9007-police-arrest-90-al-
leged-mafia-members-in-europe-and-latin-america
f InSight Crime. Massive Bust Shows Italian Mafia Role in LatAm Drug 
Trade. June 2016. accessible at https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/
massive-bust-highlights-italian-mafia-involvement-in-latam-drug-trade/
g ANSA. 90 ‘Ndrangheta arrests in Europe-S. America opera-
tion. 5 December 2018. Accessible at: http://www.ansa.it/
english/news/2018/12/05/90-ndrangheta-arrests-in-europe-s.-america-
operation_49f76481-9667-41b4-a365-11f7b174430f.html 
h Agencia Brasil, Links found between Italian mafia and 
Brazilian druglords. 26 May 2014. Accessible at: http://
agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/geral/noticia/2014-05/
links-found-between-italian-mafia-and-brazilian-druglords
The activity of such groups in South America is not an 
entirely new phenomenon, although their importance and 
reach appear to have expanded significantly by now, plac-
ing them among the major players. It has also been argued 
that the seafaring tradition and ties of some of the Balkan 
countries with merchant shipping, arising through their 
location on the Adriatic, have provided the opportunity 
for some of these groups to develop trafficking networks 
based on maritime routes.94,95 
94 Tony Saggers, An assessment of the extent of Albanian(-speaking) organised 
crime groups involved in drug supply in the European Union: characteristics, 
role and the level of influence, EMCDDA Background paper, 2019.
95 Nacional – Neovisni News Magazin, While cocaine jet-setter Michael Dokovich fights 












Several sources corroborate the expanded role of Balkan 
groups in the international illicit trade of cocaine, however 
such reports do not always distinguish the identity of such 
groups with sufficient detail. It is likely that Albanian-speak-
ing groups in particular operate largely autonomously from 
other groups from the Balkan region (although collabora-
tion also occurs).96 Authorities from the United Kingdom 
identified Albanian groups in particular, among criminals 
from the Balkans, and assessed that they had established 
considerable control across the United Kingdom drug 
market.97
Since 2010, Italy, Germany and Belgium have consistently 
identified Albanian among the top ten nationalities of indi-
viduals brought into formal contact with police for cocaine 
96 Tony Saggers, An assessment of the extent of Albanian(-speaking) organised 
crime groups involved in drug supply in the European Union: characteristics, 
role and the level of influence, EMCDDA Background paper, 2019.
97 Thirteenth Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agen-
cies, Europe, Lisbon, 2–5 July 2019. Country Report by the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
trafficking offences, but in more recent years such a role 
has also been reported by Austria, Bulgaria, Greece and 
Switzerland.98 Italy also identified Albanian groups as the 
most active, as of 2018, among foreign groups involved 
in trafficking and distribution of drugs, and assessed that 
such groups cooperate with domestic organizations in this 
activity. In 2018, Italy also registered an increase in cocaine 
seizures quantities at land borders, notably in the northeast; 
Italian authorities ascribed these increases to new trafficking 
dynamics attributable to Balkan groups, such as Albanian, 
Serbo-Montenegrin and Bulgarian groups, increasingly 
involved in the importation of large quantities of cocaine 
on maritime routes flowing into ports in the Aegean sea 
(Turkey and Greece) as well as the Black Sea (Bulgaria, 
Romania).99 
In Germany, the activities of Albanian-speaking criminal 
networks appear to be focused on drug trafficking, and 
specifically cocaine. German authorities assessed that, for 
98 UNODC, responses to the annual report questionnaire for 2010-2018.
99 Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga, Italy, Relazione Annuale 
2019, 2019. 
FIg. 9 Distribution by size of seizure of most frequently occurring foreign nationalities of individuals  
arrested in European countries in connection with cocaine seizure cases, 2018-2020
Notes: The figure is based on data for 1,878 arrestees from a subset of 1,375 individual seizure cases for which information was available to UNODC; this constitutes an 
opportunistically determined subset of all relevant seizures. Number in brackets denotes total number of arrestees of the given nationality. Nationalities with less than 
50 arrestees are not shown. The acronym BCMS refers to the four Serbo-Croatian-speaking countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia, taken 
collectively. For some of these countries, taken individually, the number of arrestees was too small to allow a statistically meaningful breakdown. 
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29 among 31 Albanian-dominated groups detected in 
2019, drug trafficking was the identified area of activity 
– second only to German-dominated groups (66 groups 
active in drug trafficking out of 171), and ahead of Turkish-
dominated groups (23 groups active in drug trafficking out 
of 78).100 In addition, among all individuals brought into 
formal contact with the police for trafficking offences in 
Germany in 2019, Albanian nationality was ranked second 
for cocaine-related offences – again second only to German 
and ahead of Turkish, but not among the top 10 for any of 
the other drug classes (cannabis, opioids and amphetamine-
type stimulants).101 
100 Bundeskriminalamt. Organisierte Kriminalität. Bundeslagebild 2019. 
November 2020.
101 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from Germany for 2019.
It appears that Albanian-speaking groups may manage 
cocaine distribution networks across Europe with a certain 
degree of transnational coordination, in addition to forming 
direct relationships with suppliers in Latin America. Some 
reports indicate that, starting in 2012, Albanian-speaking 
groups developed influence in key ports both in South 
America (the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, 
Colombia and Ecuador) as well as Europe (initially in Bel-
gium and the Netherlands and subsequently in Germany 
and Spain), and were also engaged in distribution in Ger-
many, Sweden, the United Kingdom and even Australia.102 
Already as of 2012, Italian authorities had identified an 
102 Tony Saggers, An assessment of the extent of Albanian(-speaking) organised 
crime groups involved in drug supply in the European Union: characteristics, 
role and the level of influence, EMCDDA Background paper, 2019.
Joint investigation team leads to dismantling of one of Europe’s most 
active Albanian-speaking networks trafficking cocaine into Europe
An unprecedented international operation involv-
ing judicial and law enforcement authorities in 10 
countries has resulted in the complete takedown 
of the Albanian-speaking ‘Kompania Bello’ criminal 
group, one of the most active cocaine-trafficking 
networks in Europe. 
In the early hours of 15 September 2020, hundreds 
of police officers, including special intervention 
teams and in close cooperation with prosecu-
tors and investigative officers, with the support of 
Europol and Eurojust, carried out coordinated raids 
against the members of this highly professional 
criminal syndicate. 
As a result of this joint action, 20 individuals were 
arrested in Italy (5), the Netherlands (2), Germany 
(2), Greece (2), Romania (1), Hungary (1), Spain 
(1), Albania (5) and the United Arab Emirates (1). 
The suspects were placed in pre-trial detention for 
international narcotic substances trafficking, ille-
gal possession and distribution of drugs and brutal 
assaults, including murder. These arrests followed 
those of 84 other members of the same criminal 
group earlier on during the investigation in Italy, 
Ecuador, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland and Germany. 
This international sweep followed a complex investi-
gation led by the Italian State Police (Polizia di Stato) 
under the direction of the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
of Florence (Procura della Repubblica di Firenze). 
It is considered the biggest ever of its kind against 
Albanian-speaking organized crime and was the 
result of a Joint Investigation Team with the partici-
pation of Italy and The Netherlands, in which the 
parties worked closely together for five years. Close 
to 4 tons of cocaine and over €5.5 million in cash 
were seized over the course of this investigation. 
A sophisticated business model
For years, international importers of cocaine to 
Europe have been working separately from the 
wholesalers and the gangs distributing the drug on 
the streets. The model revealed in this case was dif-
ferent, as the Albanian-speaking network was able 
to control the whole supply chain – from arranging 
huge shipments directly from South America to the 
distribution throughout Europe. 
Using sophisticated encrypted communication 
means, the organization’s ringleader – a 40-year 
old Albanian national based in Ecuador – negoti-
ated directly with the South American drug cartels, 
arranged large shipments of cocaine to the major 
ports of Europe and, with the help of accomplices 
based in Italy, the Netherlands and Albania, orga-
nized distribution throughout Europe. The cocaine 
was smuggled across European borders concealed 
in vehicles equipped with sophisticated hidden 
compartments. 
The criminals laundered their proceeds using an 
underground alternative remittance system of Chi-
nese origin, known as the fei ch’ien system. Much 
like the hawala transfer system, people using the fei 
ch’ien deposit a sum in a network ‘agency’ in one 
country. Another operator withdraws the equivalent 
amount elsewhere in the world and passes it on to 
the intended recipient. Leaving not a trace of tell-
tale evidence for law enforcement investigators, 
the network is believed to have laundered millions 
of euro through this system.
Source: Europol, Joint investigation team leads to dismantling of one of 
Europe’s most active Albanian-speaking networks trafficking cocaine into 














Albanian-speaking organization, active between the Benelux 
countries and Italy, which had established ties to Colom-
bian suppliers.103 Belgium reported that Albanian-speaking 
groups, beyond the extraction of cocaine from ports, were 
involved in the exportation of cocaine to Italy and Albania 
(as of 2018).104 In 2018, Italian authorities dismantled a 
criminal group, operating from Rome and made up predom-
inantly of Albanian citizens, which was trafficking cocaine 
imported from Spain and the Netherlands and intended 
for the entire Italian territory.105 Greece reported that, as 
of 2017, Albanian traffickers were increasingly expanding 
into the cocaine illicit trade and were working with Latin 
American counterparts in order to import significant quan-
tities into Greek territory, with the aim of distributing it 
further.106 Greece further reported that, as of 2018, some 35 
per cent of individual members of criminal groups involved 
in cocaine trafficking held Albanian nationality (second 
only to Greek nationality), but that the proportion was 
even higher among leadership positions.107 
In 2017 and 2018, German authorities conducted an 
investigation into a group, composed mainly of Albanian 
nationals, which was importing large quantities of cocaine, 
under cover of shipments of banana, from Ecuador through 
the port of Hamburg. The investigation was triggered by 
an episode in which cocaine ended up in numerous facili-
ties for storing and ripening bananas across Germany, and 
being retrieved by Albanian nationals who had travelled to 
Germany for this purpose. The case also had connections 
to Paraguay, the Netherlands and Albania.108 
DTOs comprised of Albanian-speaking criminals are 
believed to have used their close ties to the Italian ’Ndrang-
heta, as suggested by media sources,109 to establish their 
own wholesale supply of cocaine from Latin America to 
Europe by directly engaging with producers in Colombia 
and establishing a permanent presence in source regions.110 
The presence of Albanian-speaking drug traffickers in Latin 
America has also been linked in the media to a number 
of homicides in Latin America of criminals of Albanian 
origin suspected of being involved in the illicit trade of 
drugs over recent years.111 
Albanian-speaking groups have established 
a presence in source regions and their own 
wholesale supply chain to Europe
103 Fondazione ICSA, Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga. Rapporto 
Narcotraffico 2012, November 2012.
104 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from Belgium for 2018.
105 Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga, Italy, Relazione Annuale 
2019, 2019. 
106 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from Greece for 2017.
107 UNODC, response to the annual report questionnaire from Greece for 2018.
108 Bundeskriminalamt. Rauschgiftkriminalität. Bundeslagebild 2018. Sep-
tember 2019.
109 The Times, Rise of the ’Ndrangheta: how the feared Calabrian mafia has 
reached the UK, 2 December 2018.
110 The Guardian, Kings of cocaine: how the Albanian mafia seized control of 
the UK drugs trade, 13 January 2019.
111 Vice Media Group, The Inside Story of Europe’s First Narco-State, 6 June 2019.
Criminal networks originating from 
the Western Balkans
Aside from Albanian-speaking groups, other European 
DTOs originating from the Balkan region have been active 
in Latin America for some time organizing the trafficking 
of cocaine from Latin America to Europe. Developments 
in Colombia in particular may have helped these groups 
to obtain cocaine directly at source without the need for 
middlemen. Previously, DTOs composed of nationals of 
Balkan countries such as Croatia or Serbia were primarily 
present in countries of departure for cocaine trafficked to 
Europe such as Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.112 Increas-
ingly, these types of DTOs are also present in countries 
of production–notably Peru–where they can engage with 
the local criminal networks controlling the production 
of cocaine directly. As documented in open sources, in 
July 2016, a Serbian national, allegedly affiliated with the 
“Group America” and previously based in Argentina (from 
where he allegedly orchestrated the trafficking of large quan-
tities of cocaine to the Netherlands and Spain) was arrested 
in Peru, where he may have attempted to establish links 
with drug traffickers operating in the port of Callao.113 
In 2019, authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina assessed 
that there were groups in the country participating in 
international smuggling of cocaine destined for Western 
Europe for its subsequent distribution and selling across 
Europe.114 
In recent years, the illicit activities of European DTOs 
originating from the Balkan region related to cocaine traf-
ficking from Latin America appear to have significantly 
intensified. In 2018 and 2019, suspects originating from 
the Serbo-Croatian speaking countries115 of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia were identified 
and arrested for arranging the transportation of significant 
amounts of cocaine to Europe departing from Argentina, 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of ), Brazil, Colombia, Ecua-
dor and Peru.116 Based on data on large (100kg or more) 
individual seizures of cocaine made in Europe from 2017 
onwards, Dutch nationality ranked first among people 
arrested in connection with such seizures, but nationals 
of the four Balkan countries mentioned above, considered 
together, were equally prominent.117 
Several recent incidents and investigations reported in open 
sources also highlight in particular the role of Montenegrin 
112 Igor Spaic, The Long Trial of the Balkan ‘Cocaine King’, Organized Crime 
and Corruption Reporting Project, 9 February 2016. 
113 Mimi Yagoub, Arrested Serb Highlights South America’s Balkan Connec-
tion, Insight Crime, 15 September 2016.
114 Thirteenth Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, 
Europe, Lisbon, 2–5 July 2019. Country report by Bosnia and Herzegovina.
115 In linguistic terms, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian and Montenegrin may 
be considered as four standard varieties of Serbo-Croatian. See: Šipka, 
Danko, Lexical layers of identity: words, meaning, and culture in the Slavic 
languages (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2019).
116 Europol information based on intelligence.







groups and Montenegrin nationals in cocaine trafficking. 
In February 2020, authorities in Aruba seized 5 tons of 
cocaine on board of a cargo ship destined for Greece and 
arrested several Montenegrin members of its crew.118 In 
June 2019, authorities in the port of Philadelphia, United 
States, seized the remarkable quantity of 20 tons of cocaine 
from a container ship119 en route to the Dutch port of 
Rotterdam, and arrested several Montenegrin members 
of its crew.120 In 2015, five Montenegrin nationals were 
arrested after they organized a drop-off from cargo ships 
of cocaine, collected near the Spanish coast by small yachts 
and delivered to Spanish ports. 121  
118 Samir Kajosevic, Montenegrin crew of cocaine ship arrested in Caribbean, 
Balkan Insight, 26 February 2020.
119 CNN, Record cocaine seizure at Philadelphia terminal weighed nearly 20 
tons - or 39,525 pounds, June 27, 2019.
120 Nacional – Neovisni News Magazin, While cocaine jet-setter Michael 
Dokovich fights his extradition to Croatia, the Balkan Cartel is on the rise, 
13 November 2019.
121 Nacional – Neovisni News Magazin, While cocaine jet-setter Michael 
Dokovich fights his extradition to Croatia, the Balkan Cartel is on the rise, 
13 November 2019.
Media sources also suggest that, in many cases these DTOs 
do not route the trafficked cocaine via their countries of 
origin in the Balkans, but use well-known entry points 
and drug trafficking hubs in Europe122 such as the ports of 
Antwerp, Rotterdam, Valencia or major airports.
Balkan DTOs appear to be also using their contacts and 
access to wholesale drug supply in Latin America to traffic 
cocaine not only to Europe, but also to other profitable 
destination markets in Asia and Oceania, where they coop-
erate with local DTOs for the distribution of cocaine.123,124
122 Dnevni Avaz, Otkrivamo nove detalje: Braća Gačanin glavni uvoznici 
kokaina za Evropu, 11 July 2019.
123 Blic, Ovo je novi svetski Put Droge, a njime gospodari Balkanska Mafija, 
26 August 2019. 
124 Europol, Balkan cartel trafficking cocaine around the globe in private 
planes busted, 25 July 2019. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.
eu/newsroom/news/balkan-cartel-trafficking-cocaine-around-globe-in-
private-planes-busted
Balkan-based network trafficking cocaine around the globe in private 
planes dismantled, 2019
Operation Familia, coordinated by the United 
States Drug Enforcement Administration and 
Europol, led to a total of 16 arrests—11 in Europe 
(Croatia, Czechia, Serbia and Switzerland) and 5 in 
Hong Kong, China—as well as the seizure of more 
than one ton of cocaine in two separate instances.
Law enforcement agencies from across the globe 
teamed up against a Balkan organized criminal 
network suspected of large-scale cocaine traffick-
ing from South America to Europe using private 
planes. The investigation was launched and led 
by the Croatian Police (Policijski nacionalni ured 
za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminala) 
and the Croatian Special Prosecutors’ Office for 
Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime, 
in early 2018. It also involved authorities from 
Czechia, Serbia and Slovenia. 
The investigation revealed that the Balkan traffick-
ers were not only operating in Europe and South 
America, where they prepared several flights from 
one continent to another between 2018 and 2019, 
but also in Asia, where they facilitated and coor-
dinated the maritime trafficking of multi-kilogram 
quantities of cocaine, mostly in Hong Kong, China 
and Macao, China.
Parallel investigations revealed that the organized 
criminal network had close ties to many criminal 
associates and contacts operating out of various 
countries—primarily Australia, Belgium, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Czechia, France, Hong Kong, China, 
Italy, Macao, Malaysia, Paraguay, Serbia, Slovenia 
and Uruguay.
In May 2019, the joint collaboration of law 
enforcement agencies resulted in the seizure of 
a consignment of 600 kg of cocaine, as well as 
the arrest of one of the ringleaders, in Switzerland, 
while the suspect was coordinating the importa-
tion of the consignment using a private plane. The 
suspect had an international criminal background 
in Europe and beyond. Another high-value target 
was arrested in Croatia.
In parallel with the activities in Europe and South 
America, investigations identified a Balkan criminal 
cell that operated out of Asia, receiving cocaine 
shipments by sea, and resulted in the seizure of 
421kg of cocaine carried out by Hong Kong Cus-
toms and Macanese Judicial Police.
In Croatia, Czechia, Serbia, Slovenia and Switzer-
land, €2 million in cash was seized and more than 
€1 million in luxury goods, such as high-quality 
watches and vehicles were confiscated.
 
Source: Europol, Balkan cartel trafficking cocaine around the 













Emerging pattern of criminal  
consortia 
Another new phenomenon involves increased coopera-
tion between DTOs based in Europe. Recent reports in 
the media suggest possible collusion among European 
high-level cocaine brokers and traffickers from distinct 
backgrounds. One example of an attempt at collusion 
among different groups may have been observed in 2017 
in Dubai, involving individuals with ties to Irish, Italian, 
Bosnian and Dutch DTOs.125,126,127,128 Italian authorities 
also assessed that the Italian criminal network Camorra in 
particular participated in such “criminal consortia.129 
in some cases, DTOs have pooled their cap-
ital to jointly purchase larger quantities to 
maximize profits
Another instance of such collaboration, reported in the 
media, may have been detected when French and Ameri-
can authorities stopped, in November 2017, a pattern of 
charter flights arriving at Biarritz, France loaded with large 
quantities of cocaine from Colombia and organized by a 
mix of Albanian, Turkish, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, French 
and English masterminds.130 As previously described, some 
of these DTOs now have direct access to cocaine producers 
in Latin America, but individually would lack the capi-
tal required to procure cocaine in quantities that would 
ensure sufficient profit margins. In some cases, these DTOs 
have pooled their capital to jointly purchase larger quanti-
ties to maximize profits.131 It is plausible that a dynamic 
and stimulated global market for cocaine will continue to 
engender such patterns of collaboration in the procurement 
and trafficking of cocaine in the future.
125 Algemeen Dagblad, Bundelen cokekartels de krachten in Dubai?, 18 Octo-
ber 2019.
126 NL Times, Taghi part of ‘Super Cartel’ Controlling Third of EU Cocaine 
Trafficking, 18 October 2019.
127 thejournal.ie, The curious case of Daniel Kinahan: Cocaine scion or boxing 
power broker?, 17 May 2020. Available at: https://www.thejournal.ie/
daniel-kinahan-dubai-5097835-May2020
128 The Irish Sun, Dutch drugs baron part of “super cartel” with Daniel Kina-
han arrested in Dubai and extradited back to the Netherlands, 22 Decem-
ber 2019.
129 Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga, Relazione Annuale 2020, 
2020.
130 El Tiempo, Los vuelos chárter colombianos que llenan de coca a Europa, 25 
November 2017.
131 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report 2019 (Luxembourg, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2019).
Latin American criminal  
networks maintaining a  
presence in Europe
E urope continues to be an attractive destination market for cocaine producers. Cocaine-produc-ing criminal networks from Colombia, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia have long 
maintained contacts with European criminal networks in 
order to arrange the wholesale supply of unprecedented 
amounts of cocaine.132 Cocaine achieves very high prices 
in Europe compared to most other regions of the world, 
which implies significant profit margins both for produc-
ers and distributors of cocaine on the European market. 
Similar to their European counterparts’ presence in Latin 
America, Latin American criminal networks are also 
established in Europe. However, their presence remains 
limited and is largely restricted to liaising with Europe-
based criminal counterparts and with facilitators of money 
laundering schemes.133 Some Colombian drugs traffick-
ing organizations have formed “consortia” with criminal 
networks based in Europe. They take responsibility for 
the reception, storage and further wholesale distribution 
of cocaine trafficked to the EU.134 
For example, acting as permanent representations for 
Colombian criminal networks, so-called “Collection 
Offices” (Oficinas de Cobro) are established in key loca-
tions for the cocaine trade in the EU such as Spain or the 
Netherlands.135 These small representations supervise the 
arrival of shipments, handover to clients, payment collec-
tion and liaising with money laundering service providers.136 
Such cells have been occasionally documented in the media. 
For example, in January 2021, Spanish authorities arrested 
4 individuals, nationals of Colombia, Spain and Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of ), belonging to a cell, with ties to 
Colombian and Peruvian DTOs, whose main functions 
appear to have included debt collection, assassinations and 
laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking.137 In May 
2014, Spanish police arrested 13 individuals, including 9 
Colombians, accused of acting as an “Oficina de Cobro” for 
the Colombian group Urabeños.138 In July 2014, Spanish 
police arrested one of the main leaders of the Colombian 
132 Phil Williams, Transnational Criminal Organisations and International 
Security, in: In Athena’s Camp, RAND Corporation, 1997.
133 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report 2019 (Luxembourg, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2019).
134 Europol information based on intelligence.
135 Jeremy McDermott, La nueva generación de narcotraficantes colombianos 
post-FARC: “Los invisibles”, InSight Crime, 14 March 2018.
136 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report 2019 (Luxembourg, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2019).
137 El Espectador, Detienen en España a una banda vinculada a carteles de 
droga de Colombia y Perú, 20 January 2021.







group Oficina de Envigado139 and another affiliate of the 
same group in 2016.140 The Oficina de Envigado originated 
as a debt collection agency for the Medellin cartel and is 
reportedly still more of a service provider to drug traffickers 
than a drug cartel in itself.141 Some research has also posited 
an emerging type of high-level criminal operators controlling 
the production of cocaine in Colombia called “Invisibles”.142 
While these individuals have little direct involvement in 
criminal activities, they maintain contacts with clients and 
use representatives based both in Colombia and in Europe.
As mentioned previously, Colombian nationals are also 
sometimes involved in the secondary extraction, in Europe, 
of cocaine trafficked within carrier materials. 
Mexican cartels are multinational criminal organizations 
and highly active on the global drug market. These sophis-
ticated organizations are typically involved in four principal 
areas of activity: drug trafficking (precursors supply, drug 
production, storage, transport and distribution), secu-
rity services (professional killers, known as ‘sicarios’), 
legal assistance (of members in court proceedings), and 
finance operations (payments, money laundering and 
investments).143 
139 BBC News, Spanish police arrest ‘Colombian drug lord el Raton, 19 July 2014.
140 La Información, Del ‘Carbonero’ a ‘Snoopy’ o ‘Nené’, el rebrote de los 
sicarios colombianos en España, 12 March 2016.
141 Insight Crime, Oficina de Envigado, 7 June 2019. Available at: https://
insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/oficina-de-envigado-
profile/
142 Jeremy McDermott, La nueva generación de narcotraficantes colombianos 
post-FARC: “Los invisibles”, InSight Crime, 14 March 2018.
143 Europol information based on intelligence.
In the European Union, these organizations use representa-
tives or independent intermediaries to cooperate with local 
DTOs. While Mexican criminal organizations were previ-
ously only marginally involved in drug (including cocaine) 
trafficking in Europe, they have more recently intensified 
their activities in Europe. 
In February 2020 Italian authorities foiled an attempt 
by the Sinaloa cartel to supply cocaine from Colombia 
to traffickers in Italy through Catania (Sicily).144 Open 
sources suggest that the cartel was aiming to develop a new 
route involving large shipments trafficked by private plane 
from Colombia to small airports in Italy. However, in this 
instance around 400 kg reached Fontanarossa airport (Cata-
nia) on a passenger flight. The law enforcement operation 
appears to have involved the infiltration of informants.145 
144 Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga, Italy, Operazione Halcon – 
Guardia di Finanza di Catania – 7 misure restrittive per traffico interna-
zionale di cocaina – supporto e collaborazione della D.C.S.A, 14 February 
2020. Available at: https://antidroga.interno.gov.it/operazione-halcon-
guardia-di-finanza-di-catania-7-misure-restrittive-per-traffico-internazi-
onale-di-cocaina-supporto-e-collaborazione-della-d-c-s-a/
145 Cecilia Anesi and Giulio Rubino, Inside the Sinaloa Cartel’s Move Toward 
Europe, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 15 December 2020.
Violence associated with cocaine trafficking
The use of violence by criminal networks is a growing 
concern in Europe. Over the last few years, a surge 
in serious violent incidents associated to organized 
crime, particularly drug markets, has been seen.
In recent years, drug-related conflicts have resulted 
in public shootings, bombings, kidnappings, torture 
and intimidation. Cocaine (and cannabis) markets 
have attracted new DTOs, resulting in intensified 
competition.
In the spring of 2020, the French and Dutch 
authorities, with the support of Europol and other 
countries, carried out investigations into organized 
crime groups using an encrypted communications 
platform. The data collected provided law enforce-
ment agencies with a unique global view of the 
activities of high-risk organized crime groups, 
particularly in drug trafficking, but also in the use 
of violence. Hundreds of serious violent crimes 
including also homicides and threat to life incidents 
were detected and/or prevented. One investiga-
tion involved shipping containers detected in the 
Netherlands that had been converted into cells to 
be used as torture chambers.a, b
In the United Kingdom, “crack” cocaine is one of 
the drug types (alongside heroin) most strongly 
associated with the “county lines” trafficking 
model, which is assessed to be driving violence at 
the lower end of the supply chain and drawing in 
young people in particular.c,d
a BBC News, Six arrested after ‘Dutch torture chambers’ found, 7 July 
2020. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53325388
b Europol, Dismantling of an encrypted network sends shockwaves through 
organised crime groups across Europe, 2 July 2020. Available at: https://
www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/dismantling-of-encrypted-net-
work-sends-shockwaves-through-organised-crime-groups-across-europe
c United Kingdom National Crime Agency, County lines gang violence, 
exploitation and drug supply, National Briefing Report, November 2016.
d Dame Carol Black, Review of Drugs – evidence relating to drug use, 












While there is some awareness of the global connections 
and the use of representatives from criminal organizations 
in source and destination regions which facilitate the global 
trafficking of cocaine, many aspects remain unclear:
• What is the scope of the presence and the activities of 
South American criminal networks based in Europe 
and which exact function do they play in maintaining 
the flow of cocaine from production to destination 
regions?
• How has the role of West African and North African 
countries evolved as transit and, potentially, as destina-
tion countries for cocaine produced in South America 
and trafficked to destination markets in Europe and 
elsewhere?
• Who are the main local interlocutors for European 
criminal networks maintaining a presence in South 
America in order to procure wholesale quantities of 







CRIMJUST is implemented by UNODC in partnership with INTERPOL and 
Transparency International. CRIMJUST seeks to enhance law enforce-
ment and judicial strategies beyond interdiction activities and to foster 
transnational responses along drug trafficking routes targeting each stage 
of the drug supply chain. This includes the production of knowledge on the 
cocaine market to support evidence-based policy and strategies designed 
to counter the cocaine threat.Going Beyond Drug Seizures
